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Abstract.
Although many people have thought that the difference between the Copenhagen
and many-worlds versions of quantum theory was merely metaphysical, quantum cos-
mology may allow us to make a physical test to distinguish between them empirically.
The difference between the two versions shows up when the various components of the
wavefunction have different numbers of observers and observations. In the Copenhagen
version, a random observation is selected from the sample within the component that is
selected by wavefunction collapse, but in the many-worlds version, a random observa-
tion is selected from those in all components. Because of the difference in the samples,
probable observations in one version can be very improbable in the other version.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Hugh Everett III formulated his many-worlds alternative [1,2] to the
Copenhagen version of quantum theory, there has been considerable discussion of its
merits. Many people, including some of the original supporters of the many-worlds
version, have expressed the opinion that the many-worlds version is empirically
indistinguishable from the Copenhagen version, so that the difference is merely
metaphysical.
For example, in the first wide popularization of the many-worlds or Everett-
Wheeler-Graham (EWG) version of quantum theory, Everett’s bulldog Bryce De-
Witt stated [3], “Clearly the EWG view of quantum mechanics leads to experimen-
tal predictions identical with those of the Copenhagen view.”
Everett’s Ph.D. supervisor John Wheeler, who initially supported the many-
worlds version [4], has recently summarized it as follows [5]: “Does it offer any
new insights? Does it predict outcomes of experiments that differ from outcomes
predicted in conventional quantum theory? The answer to the first question is
emphatically yes. The answer to the second question is emphatically no.”
Roland Omne`s, though never a supporter of the many-worlds version to my
knowledge, has thought about it deeply and concluded [6], “If quantum mechanics
were absolutely true and Everett were right, no experiment would be able to confirm
or reject it. . . . It is not science because no experiment can show it to be wrong.”
However, David Deutsch has argued [7] that the many-worlds version of quantum
theory would be confirmed if an observer could “split” into two copies which make
different observations, remember that they observed but not what they observed,
and then are rejoined coherently. Although there are conceptual loopholes (such as
claiming after the experiment that the observer’s memory of having made a definite
observation is merely a false memory), I believe this argument is fairly strong
evidence that the difference between the Copenhagen and many-worlds versions
of quantum theory is, in principle at least, a matter that could be experimentally
tested. Nevertheless, this proposed test appears to be technically very difficult.
Because of the difficulties of Deutsch’s proposed experiment, here I wish to raise
the possibility that quantum cosmology might in principle lead to empirical distinc-
tions between the Copenhagen and the many-worlds versions of quantum theory.
By the Copenhagen version, I essentially mean what I might more accurately
call a single-history version, in which quantum theory gives probabilities for various
alternative sequences of events, but only one sequence actually occurs. Each such
alternative sequence might be called a “history” or a “world.”
In the many-worlds version, in contrast, all of the possible histories or worlds
with nonzero quantum probabilities actually occur, with the quantum probabilities
being not probabilities for the histories to be actualized (since all are), but instead
essentially measures for the magnitude of the existence of the various histories.
CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF
OBSERVERS
There can be significant differences in typical observations if the number of ob-
servers varies greatly from “world” to “world.” Consider the following toy models:
Quantum Cosmology Model I
World 1: Observers; measure or probability 10−100
World 2: No observers; measure or probability 1− 10−100
In a single-history version of this Model I, World 1 is very improbable to occur at
all, so any observation would be strong evidence against the single-history version.
In a many-worlds version, World 1 does occur, so observations are not evidence
against that theory.
Quantum Cosmology Model II
World A: 1010 observers during collapse; measure 1− 10−30
World B: 1090 observers during expansion; measure 10−30
In a single-history version of Model II, World B is very improbable, so a random
observation should expect to see a collapsing universe, Hubble constant H < 0,
and the probability that H > 0 is observed is only 10−30.
In contrast, in a many-worlds version of Model II, all of the observations oc-
cur, with measures presumably given by something like the expectation values of
positive operators each associated with a corresponding observation [8,9]. I shall
assume that the observers are sufficiently similar that the total measure of a certain
set of observations in a certain world (e.g., of whether the universe is expanding) is
roughly proportional to the total number of observers in that world who make the
observation, multiplied by the quantum measure of that world. I shall also assume
that the fraction of observers who do observe whether the universe is expanding or
contracting is the same in both World A and World B.
Then the total measure for World A observations of a collapsing universe is
roughly proportional to the 1010 observers times the quantum measure of nearly
unity for that world, or 1010, whereas the total measure for World B observations of
an expanding universe is roughly proportional to 1090 observers of that world times
the quantum measure of 10−30 for that world, or 1060. Thus a random observation
chosen from the sample of all existing observations in the many-worlds version is
about 1050 times more likely to be from World B, seeing H > 0, than it is to be
from World A, seeing H < 0, a situation qualitatively the reverse of the relative
probabilities in a single-history version, such as the Copenhagen version of quantum
theory.
Now if one accepted the basic quantum measures of the two worlds in Quantum
Cosmology Model II but was not very certain whether a single-history or a many-
worlds version of quantum theory were correct, then if one made an observation of
whether the universe were expanding or contracting, it would give strong evidence
as to which version is correct.
One way to explain the difference between sampling a random observation in
single-history versus many-worlds quantum theories is with lottery tickets. Suppose
that we have a quantum cosmological model with the following two worlds:
World 1: N1 observers; quantum measure or probability p1
World 2: N2 observers; quantum measure or probability p2
The single-history version of quantum theory is like assigning lottery tickets to
World 1 and World 2 in the ratio p1 : p2. Then a lottery ticket is chosen at random
to select which world, and its observers, exist.
The many-worlds version of quantum theory is like assigning lottery tickets to
each observer in World 1 and 2 with ratio p1 : p2, so that the ratio of the total
number of lottery tickets in world 1 to that in world 2 is N1p1 : N2p2. All the
observers exist, but with different measures for their reality, analogous to holding
different numbers of lottery tickets. Choosing a measure-weighted observer (or,
better, observation) at random is analogous to choosing a lottery ticket at random.
The choice really is not made (since all observations really exist in the many-worlds
version), but for saying which observations are typical, is is helpful to imagine their
being chosen randomly.
PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM
HARTLE-HAWKING
We cannot yet calculate probabilities for our observations from an accepted model
of the quantum cosmology quantum measures, so we cannot yet perform a definitive
test of whether the single-history or the many-worlds version of quantum theory is
correct. However, we can examine some highly speculative preliminary suggestions
from the Hartle-Hawking ‘no-boundary’ proposal [10–12] applied to a k = +1
Friedmann-Robertson-Walker model with a minimally coupled massive scalar field
(potential 1
2
m2φ2).
In this minisuperspace model, an approximation of the stationary phase approx-
imation for the path integral in which the scalar field starts at a value φi large
compared with the Planck value (unity here) leads to the universe nucleating with
initial size
a2i =
3
4pim2φ2i
=
p
pi
(1)
and quantum measure roughly proportional to
e−2SE ≈ epia2i = ep (2)
with p ≡ pia2i . Observations suggest m ∼ 10−6 [13].
This is actually a measure density, and it is not clear what the prefactor should
be. One simple choice is dp = 2piaida1. The resulting measure would diverge if
integrated to p = ∞ or ai = ∞, but this would correspond to φi = 0, where the
approximation is invalid. To get an inflationary solution, one needs φi > φmin ∼ 1,
so ai < am =
√
3/4pi/(mφmin) ∼ 1/m or p < pm = 3/(4m2φ2i ) ∼ 1/m2. Cut off the
measure density there and normalize it, so we get the simple idealization
P (p < p′) ≈ e
p′ − 1
epm − 1 ≈ e
−pm(ep
′ − 1) (3)
for p′ ≡ pia2i < pm ≡ pia2m ∼ 1/m2 ∼ 1012 ≫ 1.
After the universe nucleates, it undergoes slow-roll inflation with φ decreasing
from φi to φe ∼ 1 and the volume increasing to
Ve = Vi
(
ae
ai
)3
≈
√
27pi
4m3φ3i
e6pi(φ
2
i
−φ2e) = 2
√
pie−6piφ
2
ep3/2 exp
4.5pi
m2p
∼ p3/2 exp 4.5pi
m2p
, (4)
which implies that for m3Ve ≫ 1,
p ∼ 4.5pi/m
2
ln (m3Ve) + 1.5 ln ln (m3Ve)
. (5)
The entropy density after reheating is
se ∼ T 3e ∼ ρ3/4e ∼ (m2φ2e)3/4 ∼ m3/2 ∼ 10−9. (6)
By comparison, the entropy density of radiation today is
s0 ≈ 86pi
2
165
T 30 ≈ 1.22× 10−95. (7)
Assuming essentially adiabatic expansion after reheating, one gets that the volume
of the universe today is
V0 ≈ se
s0
Ve ∼ 1095m3/2Ve ∼ 1095m3/2p3/2 exp 4.5pi
m2p
∼ 1086p3/2e1.4×1013/p. (8)
Now to get something analogous to Quantum Cosmology Model II above, we
need to consider what values of p give observers mainly seeing the universe either
contracting or expanding, and how many observers are produced as a function of
p.
Let us make the crude assumption that observers require a universe of an age
at least of the order of 1060, a tenth of the age of our actual universe, and hence
a volume of the order of 10181, in order for suitable habitats to have evolved (e.g.,
planets around stars). This would give a lower limit on the volume at the end of
inflation of about
Ve >∼ 1086m−3/2 ∼ 1095. (9)
Inserting this back into the approximate relation between Ve and p gives
p < pmax ∼ 4.5pi/m
2
ln (1077) + 1.5 ln ln (1077)
∼ 4.5pi/m
2
185
∼ 7.6× 1010 (10)
as the crude condition for the existence of observers.
However, if p is sufficiently near this upper limit pmax for the existence of ob-
servers, then the universe will just barely last long enough for them, and they will
mostly exist near the end of the lifetime of the universe, when it is collapsing. For
most observers to see the universe expanding, Ve must be sufficiently larger that
the lifetime of the universe is long enough for most observers to exist while the
universe is still expanding. If the present age of the universe is a typical time for
observers, then one might estimate that the universe must still be expanding at an
age of roughly 1061 for most observers to see the universe expanding, and hence
for it to have a volume of at least of the order of 10184 then. This leads us to
Ve >∼ 1089m−3/2 ∼ 1098 and
p < pexp ∼ 4.5pi/m
2
ln (1080) + 1.5 ln ln (1080)
∼ 4.5pi/m
2
192
∼ 7.4× 1010 (11)
as the crude condition for most observers to see the universe expanding.
In other words, in the Hartle-Hawking minisuperspace model under considera-
tion, if 0 < p < pexp ∼ 7.4 × 1010, observers will exist and will mostly see the
universe expanding; if pexp < p < pmax ∼ 7.6 × 1010, observers will exist but will
mostly see the universe contracting; and if pmax < p, essentially no observers will
exist.
First, consider a Copenhagen or other single-history version of this quantum min-
isuperspace model, in which the wavefunction collapses to give a single macroscopic
history or world, a classical Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universe characterized by
φi, ai, or p.
Using the results above, the probability for the wavefunction to collapse to clas-
sical universe that lasts long enough for observers is
P (observers) ≈ e
pmax − 1
epm − 1 ≈ e
pmax−pm ∼ 10−401000000000, (12)
and the probability for it to have observers that mostly see the universe expanding
is
P (observers seeing expansion) ≈ epexp−pm ∼ 10−402000000000, (13)
both of which are utterly tiny.
Therefore, unless one had an uncertainty less than roughly e−0.924×10
12 ∼
10−40100000000 that this single-history model was correct, the evidence that observers
exist would be overwhelming evidence against it.
Even if one somehow claimed that observers were necessary (i.e., that the wave-
function could not collapse to a world with no observers), the conditional probabil-
ity of a world with observers mostly seeing the universe expand, given the condition
that observers exist, is only
P (observers seeing expansion|observers exist) ≈ epexp−pmax ∼ 10−1000000000. (14)
Thus the observation that the universe is expanding would be strong evidence
against the single-history version of this model.
On the other hand, if one takes a many-worlds version of this Hartle-Hawking
minisuperspace model, all components of the wavefunction exist that have positive
measure, no matter how small, so observers will exist in a generalization of the
model that allows sufficient structure for observers. Therefore, the existence of ob-
servers would not be evidence against a many-worlds version of a model sufficiently
general to allow observers within at least some components of the wavefunction.
However, we can still ask for the relative probabilities of observations that the
universe is contracting or expanding. In a many-worlds version, this will be roughly
proportional to the bare quantum probability for each world multiplied by the the
number of observers for that world. The unnormalized bare quantum probability
was given above as dP ≈ epdp for 0 < p < pm ∼ 1/m2 ∼ 1012. For 0 < p < pmax,
observers exist, and it is reasonable to assume that the number of them is very
roughly proportional to the volume V0 of the universe when the entropy density is
roughly the value of 10−95 that we observe, assuming that our observations of this
quantity are typical. Then in this range of p, we get an unnormalized observational
probability density roughly proportional to
dPobs ≈ V0dP ≈ V0epdp ∼ 1095m3/2p3/2 exp
(
4.5pi
m2p
+ p
)
dp. (15)
The integral of this over 0 < p < pmax diverges for p → 0 (V0 → ∞), because
of the divergence in the number of observers there, so effectively all of the obser-
vational probability occurs at that limit (infinitely large universes with infinitely
many observers, presumably almost all seeing the universe expanding, since the
stars would have all burned out in the infinite time it takes the infinitely large
universe to recollapse.)
Therefore, in a many-worlds version of this Hartle-Hawking quantum cosmolog-
ical model, one would presumably expect with very nearly unit probability that
a random observation would see the universe expanding, the opposite of one’s ex-
pectation for a single-history version of the same model. Thus if one accepted
the basic model and allowed at least some reasonable uncertainty as to whether a
single-history or a many-worlds version of the model is correct (before considering
the evidence of the sign of the Hubble constant), then one’s observation of whether
the universe is expanding or contracting would give very strong evidence in sup-
port of either the many-worlds or the single-history version respectively. This is
very similar qualitatively to the toy Quantum Cosmology Model II discussed above,
except here the quantitative differences are even grossly more severe.
Of course, this preliminary evidence from a particular implementation of the
Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal is highly speculative and is meant to be
mainly illustrative, because of the many uncertainties of the model.
CONCLUSIONS
If the amount of observations (roughly, the number of observers) varies for dif-
ferent wavefunction components, then observation probabilities depend on whether
only one component occurs in actuality (a single-history version of quantum theory,
where observations truly are made only in one history, world, or component of the
wavefunction), or whether many do (a many-worlds version, where observations
truly are made in many histories, worlds, or components of the wavefunction). In
particular, if components with relatively few observations dominate the quantum
amplitude, but other components with testably different observations dominate
the expectation value of the number of observations, which observations are most
probable varies between single-history and many-worlds quantum theories.
The Hartle-Hawking wavefunction might allow a test from the observed expan-
sion of the universe, but as of now it is highly speculative whether it is correct and
what relative probabilities it would give for observing the universe expanding.
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A shorter version of this paper has been circulated [14] and has been reported
on in the lay literature [15].
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